Abstract-In this paper, we propose a credal representation of the interval probability associated with a belief function (b.f.) and show how it relates to several classical Bayesian transformations of b.f.'s through the notion of "focus" of a pair of simplices. While a b.f. corresponds to a polytope of probabilities consistent with it, the related interval probability is geometrically represented by a pair of upper and lower simplices. Starting from the interpretation of the pignistic function as the center of mass of the credal set of consistent probabilities, we prove that the relative belief of singletons, the relative plausibility of singletons, and the intersection probability can all be described as the foci of different pairs of simplices in the region of all probability measures. The formulation of frameworks similar to the transferable belief model for such Bayesian transformations appears then at hand.
I. INTRODUCTION

B
ELIEF functions (b.f.'s) are a popular tool for representing uncertain knowledge under scarce information, as they naturally cope with ignorance, qualitative judgements, and missing data [1] . Consider a given decision or estimation problem Q. We assume that the possible answers to Q form a finite set Θ = {x 1 , . . . , x n } called "frame of discernment." Given a certain amount of evidence, we are allowed to describe our belief on the outcome of Q in several possible ways: the classical option is to assume a probability distribution on Θ. However, as we may need to incorporate imprecise measurements and people's opinions in our knowledge state or cope with missing or scarce information, a more sensible approach is to assume that we have no access to the "correct" probability distribution. The available evidence provides us with some sort of constraint on this unknown distribution. B.F.'s are mathematical descriptions of such a constraint.
Although in their original definition [2] b.f.'s are defined as set functions b : 2 Θ → [0, 1] on the power set 2 Θ of a finite universe Θ, their credal interpretation is at the center of a widely adopted approach to the theory of evidence, i.e., the "transferable belief model" (TBM) [3] , [4] . In the TBM, b.f.'s are indeed represented as "credal sets," i.e., convex sets of probabilities, whereas decisions are made by resorting to a probability called "pignistic function" BetP [b] . Based on a number of rationality principles, the pignistic function has a nice geometric interpretation. It coincides with the barycenter of the set of probability measures "consistent" with b, i.e., the probabilities whose values dominate that of b on all events A as
Here, . = denotes "is defined as," whereas P denotes the set of all probability measures on Θ.
The relation between belief and probability measures or "Bayesian b.f.'s" is central in the uncertainty theory and in the theory of evidence [2] . The problem has widely been studied under different points of view [5] - [10] . Some work has been directed to find efficient implementations of the rule of combination by reducing the focal elements (f.e.'s) of the functions to merge [11] , [12] .
A different approach instead seeks approximations that enjoy commutativity properties w.r.t. the combination rule, in particular the original Dempster's sum [13] . Voorbraak [14] has probably been the first to explore this direction. He has proposed to adopt the relative plausibility functionpl b , which is the unique probability that, given a b.f. b with plausibility pl b : 2 Θ → [0, 1], pl b (A) = 1 − b(A c ) assigns to each element x ∈ Θ of the domain its normalized plausibility. Cobb and Shenoy [15] , [16] later analyzed the properties of the relative plausibility of singletons [17] and discussed its nature of probability function that is "equivalent" (in a very precise sense) to the original b.f. More recently, a dual relative belief of singletons has been investigated in terms of both its semantics [18] and its properties w.r.t. Dempster's rule, which mirror those exhibited by the relative plausibility.
Unlike the case of the pignistic transformation, a credal semantic is still lacking for most major Bayesian approximations of b.f.'s. We address this issue here in the framework of "interval probabilities." A different constraint on the true probability p, which describes the given problem Q, can indeed be provided by enforcing lower l(x) and upper u(x) bounds on its probability values on the elements of the frame Θ. Such bounds determine an interval probability
Each b.f. determines itself an interval probability in which the lower bound to p(x) is the belief value b(x) of x, whereas its upper bound is its plausibility value pl Now, interval probabilities do possess a credal representation, which, for intervals [see (2) ] associated with b.f.'s, is also strictly related to the credal set of consistent probabilities. More precisely, the probabilities consistent with a certain interval [see (2) ] lie in the intersection of two simplices: a "lower simplex"
A. Contribution
The credal representation of the interval probability associated with a b.f. is the tool we need to provide several important Bayesian approximations with a credal semantic similar to that of the pignistic transformation. In this paper, we focus our attention on the relative plausibility [14] and belief [18] of singletons and on the so-called intersection probability, which is a new Bayesian approximation introduced in [19] as the unique representative of a probability interval [see (1) 
We prove here that each of those Bayesian transformations can be described in a homogeneous fashion as the focus f (S, T ) of a pair S, T of simplices, i.e., the unique probability that has the same coordinates w.r.t. the two simplices. A useful intuition on this notion can be given as follows. When the focus of S and T falls inside their intersection, it coincides with the unique intersection of the lines joining the corresponding vertices of S and T (see Fig. 1 ).
Here, we consider the following pairs of simplices:
We prove that, while the relative belief of singletons is the focus of {P, T 1 [b]}, the relative plausibility of singletons is the focus of {P, T n−1 [b]}, and the intersection probability is the focus of
Their focal coordinates encode major features of the underlying b.f.: the total mass it assigns to singletons, their total plausibility, and the fraction of the related probability interval that determines the intersection probability.
This provides a consistent and comprehensive credal semantics for a wide family of Bayesian transformations in terms of geometric loci in the probability simplex, which, in perspective, paves the way for TBM-like frameworks based on those very transformations.
B. Paper Outline
We start by recalling the credal interpretation of b.f.'s and interval probabilities as convex constraints on the value of the unknown probability distribution assumed to describe the problem (Section II). In particular, we focus on the credal sets of probabilities consistent with a b.f. and an interval probability, respectively, and what we call "lower" and "upper" simplices, i.e., the sets of probability measures that meet the lower and upper probability constraints on singletons.
While the pignistic function has a strong credal interpretation in its capacity as the center of mass of the polytope of consistent probabilities, other major Bayesian transformations of b.f.'s (recalled in Section III) so far lacked an analogous credal interpretation.
Drawing inspiration from the ternary case (Section IV), we prove in Section V that all the considered probability transformations (relative belief and plausibility of singletons, intersection probability) are, geometrically, the foci of different pairs of simplices and discuss the meaning of the map associated with a focus in terms of mass assignment. Returning to the original analogy with the pignistic transformation, we prove that the upper and lower simplices can themselves be interpreted as the sets of probabilities consistent with the belief and plausibility of singletons.
Finally, in Section VI, we comment on those results and prospect alternative reasoning frameworks based on the introduced credal interpretations of the upper and lower probability constraints and the associated probability transformations. The proofs of some preliminary results are given in the Appendix.
II. CREDAL SEMANTICS OF B.F.'s AND INTERVAL PROBABILITIES B.F.'s and probability intervals are different but related mathematical representations of the bodies of evidence we possess on a given decision or estimation problem Q. In most cases, it is safe to assume that the available evidence provides us with just some sort of constraint on the true distribution on Q. Indeed, both interval probabilities and b.f.'s determine different credal sets or sets of probability distributions. 
A. Credal Interpretation of B.F.'s
B.F.'s have a natural interpretation as constraints on the "true" unknown probability distribution of Q. According to this interpretation, the mass assigned to each f.e. A ⊆ Θ can freely float among its elements x ∈ A. A probability distribution compatible with b emerges by redistributing the mass of each f.e. to its singletons. 1) Example: Let us consider a little toy example, namely, a b.f. b on a frame of cardinality three Θ = {x, y, z} with f.e.'s (Fig. 2, top) : m b ({x, y}) = 2/3, m b ({y, z}) = 1/3. One way of obtaining a probability consistent with b is, for instance, equally sharing the mass of {x, y} among its elements x and y while attributing the entire mass of {y, z} to y [ Fig. 2 (bottom left)]. Another way is assigning all the mass of the f.e. {x, y} to y and giving the mass of {y, z} to z only, obtaining the Bayesian b.f. in Fig. 2 (bottom right) .
2) B.F. as Lower Bound:
The set of all and only the "consistent" probabilities obtained by reassigning the mass of each f.e. to its elements turns out to be
i.e., the set of distributions whose values dominate that of b on all events A. These are well known to form a polytope in the space P of all probability measures [21] , whose center of mass coincides with the pignistic transformation. More precisely, you can prove the following proposition [22] . Proposition 1: The polytope P [b] of all the probability measures consistent with a b.f. b can be expressed as the convex
where ρ is any permutation 1 Cl denotes the convex closure operator 
Each probability function [see (7)] attributes to each singleton x = x ρ(i) the mass of all the f.e.'s of b that contain it without containing the elements that precede x in the ordered list (x ρ(1) , . . . , x ρ(n) ) generated by the permutation ρ. When compared with the classical result by Chateauneuf and Jaffray [21] , Proposition 1 turns out to be a more stringent claim as it proves that the actual vertices [see (7)] of P [b] are associated with permutations of the elements of Θ. We are going to need this particular result in the proof of Theorem 7.
B. Credal Interpretation of Interval Probabilities
An interval probability instead provides lower and upper bounds for the probability values of the elements of Θ (singletons) as
Any b.f. determines itself an interval probability, in which the lower bound to p(x) is the belief value b(x) on x, whereas its upper bound is the plausibility value
of an event A ⊆ Θ expresses the amount of evidence carried by b, which is not against A.
The interval probabilities themselves possess a credal representation, which, for intervals associated with b.f.'s, is also strictly related to the credal set P[b] of all consistent probabilities.
1) Credal Form: By definition (5) of P[b]
, it follows that the polygon of consistent probabilities can be decomposed into a number of polytopes as
where
is the set of probabilities meeting the lower probability constraint for size-i events as
Note that, for i = n, the constraint is trivially met by all the distributions: P n [b] = P. In fact, a simple and elegant geometric description can be given if we instead consider the credal sets
Here, P denotes the set of all pseudoprobabilities on Θ, e.g., the functions p : Θ → R that meet the normalization constraint x∈Θ p(x) = 1 but not necessarily the nonnegativity constraint: there may exist an element x such that p(x) < 0.
In particular, we focus here on the set of pseudoprobability measures that meet the lower constraint on singletons as and the set T n−1 [b] of pseudoprobabilities that meet the analogous constraint on events of size n − 1 as
i.e., the set of pseudoprobabilities that meet the upper bound for the elements x of Θ.
2) Simplicial Form:
The extension to pseudoprobabilities allows giving the credal sets (9) and (10) 
the form of simplices.
A simplex is the convex closure of a collection of "affinely independent" points v 1 , . . . , v k , i.e., points that cannot be expressed as an affine combination of the others in the collection We extensively use this notation in the following propositions, as originally proven in [23] .
Proposition 2: The credal set T 1 [b] or lower simplex can be written as
which is the convex closure of the vertices
Dually, the upper simplex T n−1 [b] reads as the convex closure
of the vertices
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in the Appendix. To further clarify those results, let us denote by
the total mass and plausibility of singletons, respectively. By (12), each vertex t
of the lower simplex is a probability that adds the mass 1 − k b of nonsingletons to the mass of the element x, leaving all the others unchanged as
are actual probabilities), we have that
is completely included in the probability simplex.
On the other hand, the vertices (14) of the upper simplex are not guaranteed to be valid probabilities but only pseudoprobabilities in the sense that, while meeting the normalization constraint x p(x) = 1, they may assign negative values to some elements of Θ.
Each vertex t n−1
assigns to each element of Θ different from x its plausibility pl b (y), whereas it subtracts from pl b (x) the plausibility "in excess"
[b] (x) can be negative, and t
is not guaranteed to be a "true" probability. We will see this in the example in Section IV.
In conclusion, by (2), (15), and (10), the set of probabilities consistent with a probability interval is the intersection
III. BAYESIAN TRANSFORMATIONS OF A B.F.
The relation between belief and probability measures or "Bayesian b.f.'s" is central in the uncertainty theory [5] - [10] and in the theory of evidence [2] in particular.
A. Pignistic Function as Barycenter of Consistent Probabilities
In Smets' "TBM" [3] , [4] , [24] , [25] , beliefs are represented as convex sets of probabilities, whereas decisions are made by resorting to a Bayesian b.f. called pignistic function, i.e.,
The rationality principle behind the pignistic transformation can be explained in terms of the "floating mass" interpretation of f.e.'s exposed in Section II-A. If the mass of each f.e. is uniformly distributed among all its elements, then the probability we obtain is (16) . The pignistic function has a strong credal interpretation, as it is known [21] , [26] , [27] to be the center of mass of the set of consistent probabilities:
Many other popular and significant Bayesian functions used to approximate b.f.'s or to represent them in a decision process, however, do not yet have a similar credal interpretation. The aim of this paper is, indeed, to show that relative plausibility [14] , relative belief of singletons [18] , and intersection probability [19] possess such credal interpretations in terms of the probability interval associated with a b.f. 
B. Relative Plausibility and Belief of Singletons
The relative plausibility of singletons [14] pl b is the unique probability that, given a b.f. b with plausibility pl b , assigns to each singleton its normalized plausibilitỹ
Voorbraak proved thatpl b is a perfect representative of b when combined with other probabilities through Dempster's orthogonal sum ⊕ [13] , e.g.,pl
Cobb and Shenoy [17] later proved thatpl b meets a number of other interesting properties w.r.t. ⊕. Dually, a relative belief of singletonsb [18] can be defined. This probability function assigns to the elements of Θ their normalized belief values
Although the existence ofb is subject to quite a strong condition k b = x∈Θ m b (x) = 0, the case in whichb does not exist is indeed pathological, as it excludes a great deal of belief and probability measures [18] . Whilepl b is associated with the less conservative (but incoherent) scenario in which all the mass that can be assigned to a singleton is actually assigned to it,b reflects the most conservative (but still not coherent) choice of assigning to x only the mass that the b.f. b (seen as a constraint) assures belongs to x. It can be proven that the relative belief of singletons meets a number of properties w.r.t. Dempster's sum, which are the dual of those enjoyed by the relative plausibility of singletons [28] . These two approximations form a strongly linked couple:
we will see what this implies in terms of their geometry in the probability simplex.
C. Intersection Probability
For any interval probability (1), we can define its intersection probability as the unique probability of the form p(x) = l(x) + α(u(x) − l(x)) for all x ∈ Θ and for some constant scalar value α ∈ [0, 1] such that (Fig. 4 )
This corresponds to the reasonable request that the desired probability, as a candidate for representing the interval (1), should homogeneously behave for each element x of the domain. When the interval is that associated with a b.f., the upper bound to the probability of each singleton is, again, given by the associated plausibility value u(x) = pl b (x), whereas the lower bound to p(x) is the corresponding belief value
The intersection probability p(x) = l(x) + α(u(x) − l(x)) can then be written as [19] 
as the quantity α in Fig. 4 becomes equal to
Here again, k pl b and k b denote the total plausibility and the belief of singletons, respectively. The ratio β [b] [see (20) ] measures the fraction of the probability interval that we need to add to the lower bound b(x) to obtain a valid distribution. Another interpretation of the intersection probability comes from its alternative form
The quantity Δ(x) .
measures the width of the probability interval on x, i.e., the uncertainty on the probability value on each element of Θ. Then, R[b](x) indicates how much the uncertainty on the probability value on x "weights" on the total uncertainty y Δ(y) associated with the interval probability (1). It is therefore natural to call (22) the relative uncertainty of singletons. We can observe that p[b] distributes the necessary additional mass to each singleton according to the relative uncertainty it carries within the given interval.
IV. CREDAL INTERPRETATION OF BAYESIAN TRANSFORMATIONS: THE TERNARY CASE
Taking inspiration from the important case of the pignistic transformation, we will here be able to prove that the other Bayesian "relatives" of a b.f. also possess a credal interpretation. Let us start from the case of a frame of cardinality three: Θ = {x, y, z}. Consider the b.f. identified by red squares in Fig. 5 (as the permutations (y, x, z) and (y, z, x) yield the same distribution) as , P} and {P,
We can notice several interesting points, as follows: . This is an artifact of the ternary case.
Theorem 1: The relative belief of singletons is not always consistent.
Proof:
Forb to be consistent with b, it is necessary thatb({x
This translates as
i.e., k b = 1. Therefore, if k b < 1 (b is not a probability), then its relative belief of singletons is not consistent. A similar counterexample can be found forpl b . The inconsistency of relative belief and plausibility is due to the fact that those functions only constrain the probabilities of singletons, not considering higher size events as full b.f.'s do. Indeed, these approximationsb,pl b , and p [b] are consistent with the interval probability
Their geometric behavior described by Points 2, 3, and 4 instead hold in the general case.
V. CREDAL GEOMETRY OF BAYESIAN APPROXIMATIONS
We appreciated in the ternary case that relative belief, plausibility, and intersection probability lie in the intersection of the lines joining the corresponding vertices of pairs formed by the upper simplex, the lower simplex, and the probability simplex. This remark can be formalized through the notion of focus of a pair of simplices, laying the foundations of a credal interpretation of these three Bayesian functions.
A. Focus of a Pair of Simplices
Definition 1: Consider a pair of simplices S = Cl(s 1 , . . . , s n ) and T = Cl(t 1 , . . . , t n ) in R n−1 . We call focus on the pair (S, T ) of the unique point f (S, T ) of R n−1 , which has the same affine coordinates in Fig. 6 . Barycenter of a simplex is a special case of focus.
both simplices as
Such a point always exists. As a matter of fact, condition (25) can be written as
As the vectors {s i − t i , i = 1, . . . , n} cannot be linearly independent in R n−1 (since there are n of them), there exists a set of real numbers {α i , i = 1, . . . , n} that meet the aforementioned condition. By normalizing these real numbers in order for them to sum to 1, we have the coordinates of the focus.
The focus of two simplices does not always fall in their intersection S ∩ T . However, if this is the case, then the focus coincides with the unique intersection of the lines a(s i , t i ) joining the corresponding vertices of S and T (see Fig. 1 ) as
Suppose indeed that a point p is such that
(i.e., p lies on the line passing through s i and t i ∀ i). Then, necessarily,
The latter implies that p = i α i s i , i.e., p is the focus of (S, T ).
Notice that the barycenter itself of a simplex is a special case of focus. Indeed, the center of mass of a d-dimensional simplex S is the intersection of the medians of S, i.e., the lines joining each vertex with the barycenter of the opposite (d − 1-dimensional) face (see Fig. 6 ). However, those barycenters for all d − 1-dimensional faces form themselves a simplex T .
B. Relative Belief and Plausibility of Singletons
The notion of focus of a pair of simplices provides a unified geometric interpretation of the coherent family of Bayesian approximations formed by the relative belief and plausibility of singletons and the intersection probability.
1) Bayesian Approximations as Foci: Theorem 2:
The relative belief of singletons is the focus of the pair of simplices {P, T 1 [b]}. Proof: We need to prove thatb has the same simplicial coordinates in P and T 1 [b] . By definition (18) ,b can be expressed in terms of the vertices of the probability simplex P as
We then need to prove thatb can be written as the same affine combinationb
in terms of the vertices t
A dual result can be proven for the relative plausibility of singletons. The notion of focus of the upper and lower simplices provides indeed the desired credal semantics for the family of Bayesian approximations linked to Dempster's rule of combination in terms of the credal set associated with the related interval probability.
2) Line Coordinates ofb,pl b : It is interesting to note that the affine coordinate of both belief and plausibility of singletons as foci on the respective intersecting lines [see (26) ] has a meaning in terms of degrees of belief.
Theorem 4: The affine coordinate ofb as the focus of {P, T 1 [b]} on the corresponding intersecting lines is the inverse of the total mass of singletons.
Proof: In the case of the pair {P,
) by imposing condition (27) . The latter assumes the following form (with
A similar result holds for the relative plausibility of singletons.
Theorem 5: The affine coordinate ofpl b as the focus of
} on the corresponding intersecting lines is the inverse of the total plausibility of singletons.
Proof: Again, we can compute the line coordinate α of
) by imposing condition (27) . The latter assumes the form (being
C. Intersection Probability
An analogous result has recently been proven [23] for the intersection probability [see (19) ].
Proposition 3: The intersection probability is the focus of the pair of simplices
For the sake of completeness, the proof of Proposition 3 can be found in the Appendix.
The line coordinate of the intersection probability as a focus also corresponds to a basic feature of the underlying b.f. (or the associated interval probability, which is better).
Theorem 6: The coordinate of the intersection probability as a focus of {T Proof: Again, we need to impose condition (27) on the pair
for all the elements x ∈ Θ of the frame, with α being some constant. This is equivalent to (after replacing (12) and (14) of
, then we get for the coefficient of b x (the probability value of x):
of the width of the probability interval that generates the intersection probability can be read in the probability simplex as its coordinate on any of the lines determining the focus of Cl(s 1 , . . . , s n ) and T = Cl(t 1 , . . . , t n ) in R n−1 is naturally associated with a mapping, which maps each point of R n−1 with simplicial coordinates α i in S to the point of R n−1 with the same simplicial coordinates α i in T as
1) Mapping Associated With a Bayesian Transformation: Each pair of simplices S =
Clearly, the focus is the (unique) fixed point of this transformation: F S,T (f (S, T )) = f (S, T ). Each Bayesian transformation in one-to-one correspondence with a pair of simplices (relative plausibility, relative belief, and intersection probability) therefore determines a mapping of probabilities to probabilities.
The mapping [see (28)] induced by the relative belief of singletons is actually quite interesting.
The map [see (29) ] generates a probability by adding to the belief value of each singleton x a fraction p(x) of mass (1 − k b ) of nonsingletons. In particular, according to (19) , (29) 
In a similar fashion, the relative plausibility of singletons is associated with the mapping
which generates a probability by subtracting to the plausibility of each singleton x a fraction p(x) of plausibility k pl b − 1 in "excess." It is curious to note that the map associated withpl b also
A similar mapping also exists for the intersection probability.
D. Upper and Lower Simplices as Consistent Probabilities
The relative belief and plausibility are then the foci associated with the lower
simplices, i.e., the incarnations of the lower and upper constraints on singletons. We can close the circle opened by the analogy with the pignistic transformation by showing that those two simplices can, in fact, also be interpreted as the sets of probabilities consistent with two important quantities related to b. Let us call the set functionsp
plausibility of singletons and belief of singletons, respectively 2 (for obvious reasons). Whileb is a "discounted" probability that assigns the total mass of nonsingletons 1 − k b to Θ,pl b is a "pseudo" b.f. that assigns to Θ the nonpositive quantity
The set of pseudoprobabilities consistent with a pseudo b.f. ς can be defined as
just as we did for "standard" b.f.'s. We can then prove the following result.
of the lower probability constraint for singletons [see (9) ] is the set of probabilities consistent with the belief of singletonsb as
The simplex T n−1 [b] of the upper probability constraint for singletons [see (10) ] is the set of pseudoprobabilities consistent with the plausibility of singletonspl b as
Proof: For each b.f. b, the vertices of the consistent polytope P [b] are generated by a permutation ρ of the elements of Θ [see (7) ]. This is also true for the b.f.b, i.e., the vertices of P [b] are also generated by permutations of singletons. In this case, we have the following:
1) Given such a permutation ρ = (x ρ(1) , . . . , x ρ(n) ), the mass of Θ (the only nonsingleton f.e. ofb) is assigned according to the mechanism of Proposition 1 to x ρ (1) , whereas all the other elements receive only their original mass m b (x ρ(j) ), j > 1.
2) Therefore, all the permutations ρ putting the same element in the first place yield the same vertex of P [b] . 3) Hence, there are just n such vertices, one for each choice of the first element x ρ(1) = x. 4) However, this vertex, which is a probability distribution, has masses (simplicial coordinates in P)
is the massb assigned to Θ. 5) The latter clearly corresponds to t A straightforward consequence is that of the following corollary.
Corollary 1:
is the pignistic transform ofb, i.e.,
.
Proof: As the pignistic function is the center of mass of the simplex of consistent probabilities and the upper and lower simplices are the sets of probabilities consistent withb andpl b , respectively (by Theorem 7), the thesis follows.
Another corollary stems from the fact that the pignistic function and the affine combination commute 
If we apply the pignistic transformation, we directly get
by Corollary 1. The intersection probability lies on the segment delimited by the barycenters of the upper and lower simplices with coordinate β [b] .
VI. COMMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES
A. Bird's Eye View
In summary, all the considered Bayesian transformations of a b.f. (pignistic function, relative plausibility, relative belief, and intersection probability) possess a simple credal interpretation in the probability simplex.
Such interpretations have a common denominator, in the sense that they can all be linked to different sets of probabilities that meet the lower probability constraint, in this way extending the classical interpretation of the pignistic transformation as the barycenter of the polygon of consistent probabilities. As P [b] is the geometric incarnation of a b.f. b, the upper and lower simplices geometrically embody the probability interval associated with b as
By applying the notion of focus to all the possible pairs of simplices in the triad {P,
we obtain in turn all the different Bayesian transformations of the considered family as
Their coordinates as foci encode major features of the underlying b.f.: the total mass it assigns to singletons, their total plausibility, and the fraction β of the related probability interval that yields the intersection probability.
B. Alternative Versions of the TBM
The credal interpretation of the upper, lower, and interval probability constraints on singletons lays in perspective the foundations for the formulation of TBM-like frameworks for such systems. In the TBM, b.f.'s b are represented by their credal sets, whereas decisions are made through the corresponding barycenter, i.e., the pignistic function BetP [b] .
We can think of the TBM as a pair {P [b] , BetP [b]} formed by a credal set linked to each b.f. b (in this case the polytope of consistent probabilities) and a probability transformation (the pignistic function).
If we recall that the barycenter of a simplex is a special case of focus, then we realize that the pignistic transformation is a probability transformation induced by the focus of two simplices. The results of this paper, which are summarized in (32) , therefore suggest similar frameworks {{P,
},pl b } in which the lower, upper, and interval constraints on the probability distributions of P are represented by similar pairs, which are formed by the associated credal set (in the form of a pair of simplices) and by the probability transformation determined by their focus. In such frameworks, decisions would be made based on the appropriate focus probability: relative belief, plausibility, or interval probability, respectively.
In the TBM [29] , disjunctive/conjunctive combination rules are applied to b.f.'s to update or revise our state of belief according to new evidence. The formulation of similar alternative frameworks for the lower, upper, and interval probability systems would then need to design specific evidence elicitation/ revision operators for such credal sets. We plan to elaborate on this issue in the near future.
The TBM has been successfully applied to problems as diverse as camera motion classification [30] , valuation-based systems [31] , and climate sensitivity analysis [32] . The role of the pignistic transform in the final decision is crucial in the TBM and heavily influences the final results. It will be interesting to run experimental comparisons on the classification and decision performances obtained in such real-world scenarios by the application of the different approaches previously outlined to empirically compare the different focus-based probability transformations presented here in a coherent theoretical framework.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have given a rather comprehensive picture of the behavior of the most common Bayesian approximations of b.f.'s in the probability simplex, starting from the classical interpretation of the pignistic transformation as the barycenter of the polytope of consistent probabilities. We proved that most Bayesian transformations possess a credal interpretation in terms of the notion of focus of a pair of simplices, which are formed in the different cases by the probability simplex and the upper/lower simplices associated with the upper/lower probability constraint on singletons. The upper and lower simplices not only incarnate the interval probability associated with a b.f. but can also be interpreted as the polytopes of probabilities consistent with the plausibility and belief of singletons. We discussed the possibility that the credal interpretation of the upper, lower, and interval probability constraints on singletons might lay the foundations for the formulation of TBM-like frameworks for such systems. 
by (33).
